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The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA) 1 gives employees
the right to select their union representatives. For a variety of
reasons, however, unionized employees sometimes become dis-
satisfied with the representation their incumbent union provides
them. The NLRA permits employees to petition to remove their
incumbent union through a process called "decertification."
Unfortunately, few employees know about decertification;
fewer still know how to start the process. Moreover, union repre-
sentatives, who normally would offer employees guidance about
their rights under federal labor law, have no incentive to help
employees with decertification. And, while employers might be
willing to help, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or
"Board") has interpreted the NLRA to forbid any aid except
"ministerial aid" from the employer. The prohibition against sub-
stantial employer aid imposes strict limits on the employer's ac-
tions, and yet the legal standards used to apply the prohibition
are uncertain and vague. This uncertainty harms the interests of
employees in two ways. First, employers may be reluctant to pro-
vide even legitimate assistance to employees seeking to decertify
their union. Second, when employers do help, the NLRB often
overturns the employees' decision to decertify because, in its
judgment, the employer provided too much assistance, whether
through actions that alone were "more than ministerial" or
through a combination of too many trivial acts of assistance. Be-
cause most cases have involved more than one form of assistance,
and the Board and reviewing courts have considered the actions
only in combination, the decisions provide little guidance as to
whether an individual act is permissible or how many permissible
acts together become impermissible.
t B.A. 1996, Ball State University; J.D. 1999, The University of Chicago.
' The National Labor Relations Act is codified at 29 USC §§ 151-69 (1994). Common
references to "sections" of the Act correspond to the Act's codification. For example, Sec-
tion 7 is codified at 29 USC § 157, Section 8 is codified at 29 USC § 158, and Section 10 is
codified at 29 USC § 160.
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This Comment considers the standards that the NLRB and
the courts have used to determine what sort of employer aid in
decertification is legal under the NLRA and proposes that the
NLRB and reviewing courts categorize individual employer ac-
tions as either "trivial" or '"nontrivial." Part I explains the decerti-
fication process. Part II analyzes the Board's decisions in decerti-
fication cases to determine how it defines what acts of assistance
employers can offer. This Part then examines the costs of the un-
certainty produced by the Board's current ad hoc approach. Fi-
nally, Part III evaluates various standards that the Board and
reviewing courts have used when addressing allegations that an
employer improperly influenced a decertification decision. Part
III concludes that the Board should adopt a prohibition on all
nontrivial assistance whenever rendered. Because the NLRB has
historically refused to issue rules,2 opting instead to adjudicate
each case individually, this standard would likely be developed
through Board and court decisions reviewing employer assis-
tance. Even within the adjudicative process, however, the pro-
posed standard will force the Board and courts to classify em-
ployer assistance more clearly, thereby reducing the existing un-
certainty in this area.
I. THE DECERTIFICATION PROCESS
Section 7 of the NLRA, which grants employees in a bar-
gaining unit the right to choose a union as their bargaining rep-
resentative, also grants employees the freedom to reject union
representation and generally to abstain from union activities.3
For an employer in any way to "interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees" in the exercise of this choice is an unfair labor prac-
tice.4 As a corollary of the employees' freedom to choose a union,
See note 20 and accompanying text.
Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3).
29 USC § 157 (emphasis added). Section 9(b) discusses the term "bargaining unit" 29 USC
§ 159(b).
4 29 USC § 158(aX1). Complaints of unfair labor practices, listed in Section 8, form
the basis for Board prosecutions and decisions, the procedures for which are given in Sec-
tion 10.
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the Act also grants employees the qualified right to oust an in-
cumbent union through decertification.'
As the structure of labor-management relations has
changed,6 and union influence has declined over the last four dec-
ades,' employees have used decertification petitions with in-
creasing frequency and success. In 1965, only 200 decertification
elections were held, 64 percent of which the unions lost.' By con-
trast, between 1987 and 1991, an average of 636 decertification
elections were held each year, resulting in an average union loss
The requirements for decertification are (1) at least a year must have passed since
the employees elected or the employer recognized the union, and (2) there must not be a
collective bargaining agreement in effect (though employees may file a decertification peti-
tion in a brief window between 90 and 60 days before the expiration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement in most industries and between 120 and 90 days in the case of a health
care institution). Section 9(cX3), 29 USC § 159(cX3); General Cable Corp, 139 NLRB 1123,
1124-25 (1962) (stating the "contract bar" rule). Section 9(cXl), which regulates action on
petitions to the NLRB, provides:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as
may be prescribed by the Board-(A) by an employee or group of employees or any
individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial
number of employees... (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which
has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the bargain-
ing representative, is no longer a representative as defined in Section 9(a) ... the
Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate
hearing upon due notice.... If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that
such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and
shall certify the results thereof.
29 USC § 159(cXl). Also, even while a collective bargaining agreement is in effect, an em-
ployee-initiated petition for decertification signed by the majority of the employees may
oust the union. While invalid as a means of directly removing the union, the petition may
be used by the employer as evidence that he has a good faith doubt of the union's con-
tinuing majority status that justifies his withdrawal of recognition for the negotiation of
future agreements. Indeed, the employer may stop bargaining even before a petition is
filed or granted if he has a reasonable belief that a majority of the workers no longer wish
to be represented by the union. See Vic Koenig Chevrolet, Inc v NLRB, 126 F3d 947, 948
(7th Cir 1997); Rock-Term Co v JNTLRB, 69 F3d 803, 808 (7th Cir 1995).
' See Samuel Estreicher, Employer Involvement and the 'Company Union" Prohibi-
tion: The Case for Partial Repeal of the Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 NYU L Rev 125,
126-27 (1994) (noting the "transformed American workplace in which employers increas-
ingly expect front-line workers to take on some of the functions previously performed by
supervisors and engineers-where 'brain work' is no longer a sphere distinct from the
tasks of operators, technicians, and maintenance personnel"); Michael H. LeRoy, Employer
Domination of Labor Organizations and the Electromation Case: An Empirical Public Pol-
icy Analysis, 61 Geo Wash L Rev 1812, 1812-13 & nn 75-78 (1993) (referring to and later
substantiating the "coincidence of employer empowerment of employees and declining
unionization" (citations omitted)).
Unions represented 35.7 percent of the workforce in the private sector in 1953; in
1992, they represented only 12.7 percent. Estreicher, 69 NYU L Rev at 133 & n 27 (cited
in note 6).
' Thirtieth Annual Report ofthe NLRB Table 13 (GPO 1965).
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rate of 72 percent.9 The 1996 numbers, while lower, are still
striking: 485 decertification elections were held and the union
was ousted in 69 percent of those elections."
The decertification procedure seems simple. At least 30 per-
cent of the represented employees must sign either a petition or
individual cards asserting that they no longer want to be repre-
sented by the union. They must file this petition with the NLRB.
The NLRB verifies the veracity and validity of the petition and
schedules an election; if the union receives 50 percent or less of
the votes, decertification is complete."
Not surprisingly, the union has little interest in ensuring
that employees know of the decertification option and even less
interest in answering questions about the NLRB process.'2 The
employer, on the other hand, may be quite willing to assist. Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, however, bars. him from "interfer[ing]
with, coerc[ing] or restrain[ing]" 3 his employees in exercising
their Section 7 right 4 to decide whether to retain the union; such
actions constitute an unfair labor practice.
Just what this prohibition means in the context of decertifi-
cation assistance is unclear. 5 The Seventh Circuit has observed
that "[t]he [NLRA] forbids the employer to interfere with the
' Fifty-Sixth Annual Report of the NLRB Table 13 (GPO 1991); Fifty-Fifth Annual Re-
port of the NLRB Table 13 (GPO 1990); Fifty-Fourth Annual Report of the NRIRB Table 13
(GPO 1989); Fifty-Third Annual Report of the NLRB Table 13 (GPO 1988); Fifty-Second
Annual Report of the NLRB Table 13 (GPO 1987).
" Sixty-First Annual Report of the NLRB Tables 10, 13 (GPO 1996). A total of 984 em-
ployee petitions were filed, but 49.8 percent of them were withdrawn by the petitioners or
dismissed, most of them before a hearing occurred.
" See 29 USC § 159.
2 A commentator noted:
Most employees are unfamiliar with the process of disenfranchising themselves from
a union. Unlike the total involvement of a union's representatives during the certifi-
cation campaign, an incumbent union is clearly unwilling to provide assistance to
disgruntled employees interested in expelling it. Employees are not generally famil-
iar with the availability of regional offices of the NLRB and typically will seek advice
from their employer concerning the removal of an incumbent union.
Ellen Rust Peirce, Employer Participation in the Decertification Process: How Big a Help-
ingHand?, 31 Buff L Rev 737, 750-51 (1983). See also William A. Krupman and Gregory I.
Rasin, Decertification: Removing the Shroud, 30 Labor L J 231, 233 (1979) ("Certainly an
incumbent union will not provide disgruntled employees with any assistance. In fact,
Board decisions have upheld union expulsion of members who initiate decertification pro-
ceedings."); Douglas Ray, Industrial Stability and Decertification Elections: Need for Re-
form, 1984 Ariz St L J 257, 259 (arguing that employees should be comprehensively ad-
vised of their decertification rights, perhaps by the NLRB, to avoid this problem).
29 USC § 158(aXl).
' See note 3.
IS The NLRB has decided that Section 8(aX1) bars employers from spontaneously sug-
gesting that employees decertify their union. See Peirce, 31 Buff L Rev at 743-48 (cited in
note 12) (discussing cases that establish this proposition).
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workers' choice, but is silent on whether, if some or all of the
workers want to abandon collective bargaining, he may help them
do so.""6 According to the NLRA, employees should exercise free
choice in selecting or rejecting their representatives without in-
terference from their employer. Labor market realities complicate
this principle, however, as the employer may be the only one who
can provide the necessary assistance. For example, even if em-
ployees have talked to the NLRB, they may still have difficulty
understanding how to complete the Board's relatively complex
decertification form or they may need someone to type their peti-
tion or provide them a ride to the nearest NLRB office to drop off
the petition.' Employees know they cannot turn to their union
stewards, who normally represent the union in the bargaining
unit, for assistance, and they may be unable or unwilling to hire
their own attorneys; therefore, most employees eventually seek
assistance from their employers. Thus, the Board must walk a
fine line to prevent employers from violating Section 8(a)(1) by in-
terfering with or coercing employees' choice without penalizing
employers for assisting employees who are, in fact, exercising
their free choice. Further complicating this situation is that the
decisions, although made by an Administrative Law Judge
("AL"), can be easily appealed by either of the parties or the
Board itself by filing an exception to the decision. Once exceptions
to an ALJ report are filed, the Board is free to substitute its own
findings and order for those of the ALJ. The Board's only con-
straints are that it must rely on the record presented to the AUJ
and that Section 10 requires Board findings to be based on a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 8 Courts in turn review the Board's
decisions using a reasonableness standard.9
Both courts and commentators have criticized the NLRB for
its "stubbornly persisted-in reluctance to use its express rule-
making power"" to give employers needed guidance in this area.
18 Koenig, 126 F3d at 948 (citation omitted).
1 See Part II.
,See 29 USC § 160.
"See note 31 for discussion of the standard of judicial review.
Koenig, 126 F3d at 949-50. The Supreme Court recently noted, "The [NLRB],
uniquely among major federal administrative agencies, has chosen to promulgate virtually
all the legal rules in its field through adjudication rather than rulemaking.... [Olnly one
regulation has ever been adopted by the Board." Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc v
NLRB, 522 US 359, 118 S Ct 818, 827 (1998). This choice has been the object of both
comment and criticism. See, for example, Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First Rule-
making: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 Duke L J 274, 290-94 (1991) (discussing the un-
derlying reasons and benefits of the 1989 NLRB experiment with rulemaking); Charles J.
Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old Board Learn New Tricks?, 24 San Diego
L Rev 9, 27-42 (1987) (arguing that the NLRB should effectuate a gradual change to rule-
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Instead, the Board relies solely on adjudicating individual cases
to establish standards. Unfortunately, the Board's decisions as a
group are so unclear and contradictory that the Board often disa-
grees with the findings of its own ALJs as to whether particular
forms of employer assistance to employees seeking decertification
constitute unfair labor practices.21 Given that decertification ef-
forts are frequent, that employees are likely to seek employer as-
sistance, and that the NLRB has broad remedial powers to cor-
rect employer violations in the decertification context (ranging
from invalidating election results to reinstating the union and
compelling the employer to bargain with the union if his assis-
tance amounted to an unfair labor practice),22 it is easy to under-
stand why the uncertain standard troubles employers. It provides
them with little guidance as to what aid is appropriate and what
aid is not.
making for reasons such as economic efficiency and easier dissemination of information to
employees); Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for Rulenak-
ing, 37 Admin L Rev 163, 175-77 (1985) (arguing the NLRB should use rulemaking be-
cause it will result in better reasoned, more legitimate, and more consistent policy). In jus-
tifying its behavior to the Supreme Court in a 1969 brief, the NLRB explained that formal
rulemaking procedures are not sufficiently flexible to work effectively in the complex and
changing areas the NLRB oversees. See Burton B. Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor
Board: The Case for Making Rules on Collective Bargaining Units, 32 Lab L J 105, 111-12
(1981). Others have speculated that by legislating through adjudication, never presenting
a clear and precise statement of policy, the NLRB "is able to minimize congressional and
judicial intervention in its policies." Robert L. Willmore, Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Politi-
cal Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89 Yale L J 982, 987-88, 993-98 (1980).
" There are numerous examples of Board decisions that disagree with the ALJ's view
of the facts. See, for example, Pic Way Shoe Mart, 308 NLRB 84, 84 (1992) (finding em-
ployer's providing employee's name and phone number to a labor consultant to be a viola-
tion where ALJ had found it mere "ministerial aid" and thus no violation); Eastern States
Optical Co, 275 NLRB 371, 371 (1985) (finding assistance in preparation of petition was
ministerial aid where ALJ found violations); Placke Toyota, Inc, 215 NLRB 395, 395 (1974)
(finding typing of petition and connotation of approval constituted violation where ALJ
had recommended dismissal).
' Board elections are set aside and "rerun" when employer actions are deemed simply
to have "tainted" the results. If an employer has tainted results, he may not rely on them
to question the union's continuing majority status and withdraw recognition. This practice
derives from the Board's "laboratory conditions" doctrine, established in General Shoe
Corp, 77 NLRB 124, 127 (1948) (establishing that all elections must be free from employer
interference, in order to determine the "uninhibited desires of the employees").
NLRB remedial authority for unfair labor practices derives from Section 10(c), which
provides for a cease and desist order and "such affirmative action.., as will effectuate the
policies of this Act." 29 USC § 160(c). In Caterair International, the Board "reaffirmed its
longstanding policy that an affirmative bargaining order is the standard remedy to restore
the status quo" after an employer unlawfully withdraws recognition from an incumbent
union and subsequently refuses to bargain. 322 NLRB 64, 66-67 (1996), on remand from
22 F3d 1114, 1123 (DC Cir 1994). See also Sixty-First Annual Report at 59 (cited in note
10).
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II. EXISTING DECISIONS PRODUCE AN UNCERTAIN STANDARD
A. The Current Standard: "More Than Ministerial Aid"
The NLRB most often applies a "more than ministerial aid"
standard to decide whether an employer's assistance to an em-
ployee decertification effort is harmless or constitutes an unfair
labor practice sufficient to derail decertification.' Unfortunately
for both employers and reviewing courts, "more than ministerial
aid" is a malleable standard that eludes precise definition even
when the Board applies it. To make matters more confusing, the
Board uses different tests to determine when the standard has
been met. It has at times phrased this standard in terms of
whether "but for" the company's assistance the decertification
would have occurred, whether the employer "substantially con-
tributed" to the decertification effort, and whether the employer
provided "more than minimal support and approval"--sometimes
all in a single case.24 And in Royal Himmel Distilling Co,' the
Board intimated that an employer might lawfully provide any as-
sistance once its employees had decided to decertify.
These different interpretations of the "more than ministerial
aid" standard may reflect the fact that the Board's aims can vary.
The Board sometimes seems to be primarily concerned with how
the employer's actions affected employees in the decertification
process. At other times the Board is apparently concerned with
punishing employer misconduct, even if that conduct was ineffec-
tual.' Even when the Board uses the same phrasing, however, it
does not clearly define its use of the standard in that case; rather,
Consolidated Rebuilders, Inc, 171 NLRB 1415, 1417 (1968) (creating "more than
ministerial aid" standard used in many, but not all, subsequent NLRB and court deci-
sions). The same standard has been used, for example, in Vic Koenig Chevrolet, Inc, 321
NLRB 1255, 1258 (1996), revd, 126 F3d 947 (7th Cir 1997); Ernst Home Centers, 308
NLRB 848, 848 (1992); Pic Way Shoe Mart, 308 NLRB 84, 84 (1992); Eastern States Opti-
cal Co, 275 NLRB 371, 372 (1985); Times-Herald, Inc, 253 NLRB 524, 524 (1980).
Peirce, 31 Buff L Rev at 749 (cited in note 12), citing Dayton Blueprint, 193 NLRB
1100, 1108 (1971), and Placke Toyota, Inc, 215 NLRB 395, 395 (1974).
203 NLRB 370 (1973).
,Id at 377 (ALJ "would hesitate to find Respondent guilty of statutorily forbidden 'as-
sistance' merely because the firm's top supervisor had 'accommodated' some of his subor-
dinates by providing them with transportation," after the decision to seek decertification
had been made.).
Compare, for example, KONO-TV-Mission Telecasting Corp, 163 NLRB 1005, 1006
(1967) (finding that employer had not violated Section 8(aXl) because its actions did not
have the effect of infringing on the employees' exercise of their Section 7 rights), with The
Hearst Corp, 281 NLRB 764, 765 (1986) (punishing employer for actions of which the ma-
jority of employees was unaware, and noting that "[the finding of a violation is not predi-
cated on a finding of actual coercive effect, but rather on the 'tendency of such conduct to
interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act'") (citation omitted).
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the Board fits its fact-specific determinations into an ambiguous
standard, resulting in a standard that does not aid employers in
determining if their actions will violate the law.
B. Judicial Criticism of the Board's Standard (or Lack Thereof)
In the most recent appeals court case to address employer
assistance in decertification, Vic Koenig Chevrolet, Inc v NLRB,'
the Seventh Circuit expressed its frustration with the state of
Board decisions on this issue, disagreeing with the Board's find-
ing that the employer had interfered with its employees' free
choice.' In reviewing the Board's decision for reasonableness, the
court objected that the Board
expressly endorsed the 'no more than ministerial aid' for-
mula,... but failed to indicate whether the formula means
anything more than that the employer may not give aid that
is likely to affect the outcome of the decertification effort.
The Board... had seemed to define 'ministerial aid' as aid
not likely to affect the outcome.... But elsewhere the opin-
ion.., discusses the 'ministerial aid' formula as if its inter-
pretation stood free from any reference to the objective of
protecting the free choice of the employees, in much the
same way that the Miranda rule stands free from its under-
lying objective of preventing coerced confessions."0
The court concluded that because the Board did not explicitly
adopt a definition of "more than ministerial aid," its decision
should not be reviewed for substantial evidence that Koenig sup-
plied more than ministerial aid, but instead should be reviewed
for consistency with Section 7's "unquestioned standard" that the
employer may not interfere with free choice." Given an undefined
and ambiguous standard by the NLRB, the Seventh Circuit re-
treated to the language of the NLRA, asking not whether the
NLRB was correct that Koenig supplied more than ministerial
aid, but instead whether the NLRB was correct in its underlying
126 F3d 947 (7th Cir 1997).
Id at 947.
Id at 949.
" Id at 950. Courts review NLRB interpretations of the NLRA for reasonableness and
determinations of fact for the support of "substantial evidence" in the record as a whole.
See Chevron, USA v Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 US 837, 866 (1984); Univer-
sal Camera Corp v NLRB, 340 US 474, 477 (1951). The Administrative Procedure Act
generally requires a standard of "reasoned decisionnaking in adjudication: the agency's
decision must be "within the scope of its lawful authority," and the "process by which it
reaches that result must be logical and rational." Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc v
NLRB, 522 US 359, 118 S Ct 818, 826 (1998).
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assertion that Koenig's assistance interfered with his employees'
free choice.
The facts of Koenig illustrate why not having a coherent
standard presents problems for employers and employees. In
Koenig, employees chose first to vote to initiate a decertification
petition and then to vote again by signing individual petitions.
Both votes resulted in 7 to 4 decisions against the union. After
the votes, the employer (Koenig) told the mechanic conducting
the effort that his lawyer had advised him that the petitions had
been incorrectly worded: while the vote was conducted on the
question, "Do you wish to remain in the union?," the individual
petitions indicated that the "undersigned wish to withdraw our
membership from" the union. According to Koenig's lawyer, the
petitions should instead have stated that the employees no longer
wanted the union to represent them. The change was made, new
petitions were drawn up, and, not surprisingly, the result was the
same.2 All three actions occurred on the same day. Based on the
final set of petitions, Koenig immediately withdrew his recogni-
tion of the union.'
As the Seventh Circuit's decision points out, the only way in
which the change in wording could have affected the petition re-
sults was if one or more of the employees wanted to withdraw as
a member of the union but nevertheless wanted the union to con-
tinue representing him or her. Yet an employee does not vote
with a group to withdraw from the union; withdrawal is an indi-
vidual right.' Nevertheless, the NLRB concluded that Koenig's
assistance had "tainted" the last vote. According to the Board, the
' During the second petition vote, one of the employees was not present, resulting in a
6 to 4 vote. Koenig, 126 F3d at 950-51.
" In Koenig, there was a collective bargaining agreement in effect, so the employees'
decertification effort was barred, but the vote could be used by the employer to withdraw
recognition and refuse to negotiate future contracts with the union. Id. See also note 5.
' Id at 952. Sections 8(aX3) and 8(bX2) prohibit agreements that require employees to
be formal union members (union and closed shops). 29 USC § 158. See also NLRB v Her-
shey Foods Corp, 513 F2d 1083, 1084-85 (9th Cir 1975) (establishing that union shop con-
tracts cannot require flll-fledged membership but only the payment of dues and initiation
fees, allowing employees to treat the agreement as if it created an agency shop). Employ-
ees may therefore withdraw from the union as individuals. They may, however, still be
obligated to pay the union the costs it incurs in representing them, since (typically) until
the majority of the bargaining unit votes to decertify a union, it remains the representa-
tive of everyone in the bargaining unit, both members and nonmembers alike. Communi-
cation Workers v Beck, 487 US 735, 745-49 (1988); Wegscheid v Local Union, 117 F3d 986,
987 (7th Cir 1997). State laws may prohibit all such "union security agreements." 29 USC
§ 164(b). In the NLRA, as the Supreme Court has said, "membership is whittled down to
its financial core." NLRB v General Motors Corp, 373 US 734, 742 (1963) (upholding an
agency shop contract requiring employees to pay dues and initiation fees regardless of
whether they join).
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very fact that the labor lawyer suggested the rewording proved
that Koenig did not have an objective basis for withdrawing rec-
ognition before he rendered the "assistance." Thus, the Board
found that Koenig's withdrawal of recognition was unfounded be-
cause the provision of his attorney's advice was not simple minis-
terial aid to employees who had already decided to petition for
decertification but instead was interference with the employees'
decision.'
The Seventh Circuit held the Board's inference to be "com-
pletely unreasonable." The court suggested that the NLRB
authoritatively define its "no more than ministerial assistance"
standard either as a strict rule barring "all nontrivial assistance
whenever rendered," or as a simple effects-based rule prohibiting
any "aid that is likely to affect the outcome of the decertification
effort."37 The court claimed that the Board "flirt[ed] with" the
strict standard in its Koenig decision, yet did not "purport to
adopt it, attempt to square it with the Board's previous decisions,
or offer a justification for it." Because the Board had not pro-
vided a definition of 'more than ministerial aid," the court re-
viewed the Board's decision, looking for any impact the assistance
might have had on the employees' Section 7 rights.39
C. Lack of Clarity Provided by Board Decisions
Given a list of circumstances in which the Board has found a
violation, and one in which it has not, disagreements like the one
between the NLRB and the Seventh Circuit about whether Koe-
nig provided mere ministerial aid are hardly surprising. Com-
pounding the vagueness of the "more than ministerial aid" stan-
dard is the fact that the cases brought to the NLRB involve vari-
ous factual scenarios and contexts. These differences in prior
cases make it difficult for the ALJs, the NLRB, and the courts to
determine whether an employer in a given case has violated the
NLRA by providing 'more than ministerial aid" to its employees
in their decertification efforts.
In part, this difficulty arises because most cases involve more
than one challenged incident of assistance, making it hard to
identify exactly what types of assistande the Board or courts con-
sider ministerial. ° For example, the forms of assistance at issue
Koenig, 321 NLRB at 1260.




o There is no suggestion that the Board's changing terminology reflects a substantive
1008 [66:999
Ministerial Aid
in Koenig-typing, xeroxing, advice on wording the petition, and
providing an attorney to count the petitions-are relatively com-
mon. But the decisions do not definitively indicate whether the
NLRA allows or prohibits any individual type of assistance. Con-
sider, for example, an employer who helps employees process
their petition by getting signatures, typing the petition, and other
similar acts. In one NRLB case, Dayton Blueprint Co,4 the Board
held that an employer violated Section 8(a)(1) when it responded
to the employees' request by typing the decertification petition
and allowing the petitioning employees to file the petition on
company time and to use the company car to deliver the petition
(though it is not clear that the use of the car was approved in ad-
vance). 2 In Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry, Inc," by
contrast, the Board did not find an NLRA violation when an em-
ployees agent suggested changes to the wording of the decertifi-
cation petition and gave the employees, at their request, a ride to
the Board office." In each case, the Board's decision seems ulti-
mately based on the employer's overall conduct and not individ-
ual acts, so the decisions do not help a subsequent employer who
wants to know about the permissibility of a particular action.
Context also explains some of the difficulty. The general rule
is that even mere ministerial aid in decertification is unlawful
when it occurs in the context of other unfair labor practices:45 em-
ployees may infer antiunion animus from the employer's actions
unrelated to decertification. Evidence of unfair labor practices
may color the Board's interpretation of even the most trivial as-
sistance. Given this concern with employee perceptions, it would
seem intuitive that even a context of antiunion bias that does not
amount to an unfair labor practice should produce decisions
change in the standard of permitted employer conduct, so cases decided under alternative
terminology (that is, those that do not enunciate the "more than ministerial aid" standard)
may be considered in analyzing "ministerial aid.'
4' 193 NLRB 1100 (1971).
42 Id at 1107-08.
268 NLRB 338 (1983).
Id at 338-39.
See, for example, Royal Himmel Distilling Co, 203 NLRB at 377 (noting that while
providing transportation might itself be innocuous, it had to be considered in the context
of other Section 8(aXl) violations, as "part and parcel of [the employer's] statutorily pro-
scribed program or plan"). See also The Hearst Corp, 281 NLRB at 764-65 (finding unfair
labor practices of which most employees were unaware sufficient to keep the employer
from relying on what was probably a legitimate decertification petition to withdraw recog-
nition). Note, too, that the NLRB will normally not hold a decertification election if there
are pending charges of unfair labor practices that would interfere with the employees' free
choice in the election-these are known as "blocking charges." Michael C. Harper and
Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law: Cases, Materials, and Problems 310 (Little, Brown 4th ed
1996).
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against the employer. But the Board's decisions in such cases
have not always adhered to this principle. In GAF Corp,46 prior to
decertification the employer had made unlawful antiunion sug-
gestions and provided (unsolicited) an employee the section of the
collective bargaining agreement about revoking checkoff authori-
zations; nevertheless, the Board held that the employer did not
violate the NLRA when it simply provided accurate information
regarding the mechanics of decertification to inquiring employees
and provided wording for the caption of the decertification peti-
tion.' And in Times-Herald, Inc,48 the Board found the employer
had not violated Section 8(a)(1) even though a supervisor who
was hired as a striker replacement initiated and solicited em-
ployee support for the decertification petition through his posi-
tion's technical status as a unit member (though he himself had
never joined the union); the employer also provided the Board's
phone number and described the decertification process.49 Finally,
in another case an employer who (1) issued a memorandum indi-
cating he would preserve the status quo and employees would
benefit if they would decertify the union, then (2) provided the
language for the petition, and (3) gave the employees information
necessary to complete the form, did not violate the NLRA but
provided "mere ministerial aid to one who had decided of her own
volition to file a decertification petition."'
By contrast, at times the Board has found violations of the
ministerial aid standard using what appears to be a prophylactic
rationale in cases where the employees were probably unaware of
the employer's antiunion animus. In Central Washington Hospi-
tal,51 because the employer had earlier suggested decertification
to complaining (not inquiring) employees who took no action, the
Board held that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) simply by
answering another employee's questions, approving the wording
she devised, allowing her to circulate the petition on company
time, and giving her access to xerox and mailing facilities.52 The
Board conceded that "[m]inisterial acts by an employer that help
employees in processing a decertification petition do not neces-
sarily violate the Act,"' and that the effect of the employer's ear-
195 NLRB 169 (1972).
4' Id at 169.
4 253 NLRB 524 (1980).
Id at 526.
Ernst Home Centers, 308 NLRB at 848.





lier suggestion was not to instigate the decertification process.
Nonetheless, it found that because the employer wanted to insti-
gate the process, its other related actions that might be excusable
in other cases were not excusable here.' The Hearst Corp' illus-
trates a similar rationale. There, the employer did not actually
assist in the decertification effort, yet the Board forbade the em-
ployer from withdrawing recognition based on the employees' pe-
tition because the employer had promised benefits and engaged
in other unfair labor practices with respect to a few employees.
Although most of the employees signing the petition in this case
knew nothing of the employer's misconduct, and decertification
probably did represent the employees' will, the Board held the
employer to the "foreseeable consequences" of its actions to un-
dermine the union with respect to those few employees: "The
finding of a violation is not predicated on a finding of actual coer-
cive effect, but rather on the 'tendency of such conduct to inter-
fere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act." 7
Sometimes, however, the divergent outcomes cannot be ex-
plained by the concern about antiunion bias. Even when an em-
ployer has not demonstrated hostility toward the union, he may
not be able to tell which individual actions he can safely take. For
example, in Condon Transport, Inc,' the Board found that an
employer who responded to employee inquiries by explaining the
decertification process, procuring a Board petition form, and pro-
viding information necessary to complete the form had "en-
mesh[ed] itself" in the process sufficiently to violate the NLRA."
This result contrasts sharply with the Board's earlier finding that
the GAF Corporation's similar actions in the context of obvious
antiunion bias were permissible and with the Board's holding
that that the employer in Eastern States Optical Co'° did not vio-
late the NLRA although its attorney approved (and may have
provided) the wording for the decertification petition and pro-
vided information necessary to complete the form." Further, in
Placke Toyota,62 the Board held that the employer violated the
NLRA where a shop foreman granted an employee's request to
have a secretary type the handwritten petition (which she did on
6 Id.
56 281 NLRB 764 (1986).
Id at 764-65.
Id at 765, quotingAmason, Inc, 269 NLRB 750, 750 n 2 (1984).
211 NLRB 297 (1974).
"Id at 302.
275 NLRB 371 (1985).
"Id at 372.
215 NLRB 395 (1974).
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company letterhead) and then allowed the petition to remain on
his "order" desk for signatures. 3 And an employer who made the
mistake of contacting a labor consultant and asking the consult-
ant to call an employee who wanted advice about getting rid of
the union, "rather than merely giv[ing the employee] Labor Con-
sultant Ricker's name and telephone number," was held by the
Board to have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, even though the
AUJ had found only ministerial aid.' Similar disagreements
arose in both GAF Corp and Eastern States, where the ALJs
found violations that the Board, looking at the same facts anew,
overturned. This inability to agree on the evaluation of the same
facts further underscores the uncertainty that the Board's cur-
rent "standard" engenders.
D. Costs of Uncertainty
Some broad lines can be drawn fiom the above examples, but
they leave intact the problem plaguing the decisions-the defini-
tion of "ninisterial" or "trivial." There is a substantial gray area
of forms of assistance that the Board has approved in some con-
texts and in some combinations and held to violate the Act in
others. The resulting uncertainty is costly to all the participants.
One could argue, of course, that this uncertainty properly
chills employer involvement by making employers more cautious
about trying to influence or persuade employees to decertify their
union. Much of the assistance that employers provide could
probably be obtained by employees elsewhere, so that discourag-
ing employers might not measurably limit the employees' exercise
of their freedom of choice. Finally, it could also prevent employers
from "loopholing," avoiding those types of behavior the NLRB
might list as forbidden while nonetheless interfering with the
employees' free choice.
Section 8(a)(1), though, protects employees against true em-
ployer interference. Any chilling effect resulting from uncertainty
about the ministerial aid standard instead works to thwart the
exercise of employees' Section 7 rights, since the employer is the
most logical source of assistance when, as here, employees cannot
turn to their union representatives.
Employers bear the costs of this uncertainty most directly.
Even when their actions are not challenged by the union, employ-
ers must incur the costs of seeking legal advice in order to ensure
that they comply with the Board's murky standard. Employees
Id at 395-96.
Pic Way Shoe Mart, 308 NLRB at 84.
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also lose. First, they may have difficulty getting the neutral in-
formation that could help them make their decision to decertify.
Unless it were extremely strict, a clearer definition of "Ministerial
aid" would likely allow employers to provide several forms of aid
that employees request routinely and employers now refuse be-
cause of the uncertain legal standard. For example, under a clear
standard, it might be possible for employers to provide employees
the information necessary to complete the petition, assist in
wording the petition, or allow employees to circulate the petition
at work None of these acts, alone or in combination, can be said
to interfere with the employees' freedom of choice and, in fact,
seem to further such choice. Second, employees bear the costs of
the delay the uncertainty frequently causes; rather than decerti-
fying the union and selecting a new (or no) representative, em-
ployees often go without effective representation (and pay dues to
the incumbent union) while the union objects to employer assis-
tance, the Board adjudicates, and a rerun election is held. Third,
and less obviously, uncertainty harms the employer-employee
relationship by making it more adversarial. The employer's desire
not to run afoul of the "ministerial aid" standard, coupled with
uncertainty about the standard, may cause the employer to ref-
use to provide some forms of assistance that seem, in common
usage of the words, to be 'merely ministerial";' this behavior may
seem to employees to be unnecessarily conservative. One com-
mentator suggests, for example, that while employers may sug-
gest to inquiring employees that they call the NLRB, they would
be "ill-advised" to give them the Board phone number." Few em-
ployees will see this apparently arbitrary distinction as a clear
legal line between ministerial aid and unlawful interference; in-
stead they may suspect their employer's motives and will proba-
bly see it as frustrating their legitimate requests.
Finally, the uncertainty imposes costs on the NLRB. Most
significantly, the Board bears the cost of ordering and conducting
the rerun elections that are held when the employer's actions do
not rise to an unfair labor practice but do disturb sufficiently the
"laboratory conditions"67 of the election so that the initial election
' Commentators have noted in passing this negative policy implication of uncertainty
that the Board's standard creates. See, for example, Krupman and Rasin, 30 Labor L J at
233-34 (cited in note 12).
"Peirce, 31 Buff L Rev at 794 (cited in note 12).
' General Shoe Corp, 77 NLRB 124, 127 (1948). Of the 485 elections held in 1996, the
union objected in fifteen cases (employers objected to union actions in five cases), and thir-
teen rerun elections were held. Sixty-First Annual Report at Tables 11, MA, liC (cited in
note 10). These rerun elections reversed the initial outcome 40 percent of the time. Id at
Table liE. Granted, in absolute terms these are not large numbers. But each objection
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is set aside. The Board also incurs costs by having a standard
that results in many exceptions to and occasional reversals of
ALJ decisions. Finally, one could argue that this lack of a clear
standard limits the NLRA's effectiveness in guiding behavior.
In sum, if employers and unions knew what types of conduct
were per se forbidden and per se allowed, the Board would spend
less time and fewer resources hearing objections and conducting
second and third elections; employers would spend less time and
money in front of the Board; and employees would achieve the re-
sults they seek-usually decertification-much more quickly,
thereby saving the cost of additional dues and allowing selection
of a new union in the interim.
III. PROPOSED INTERPRETATIONS FOR A MORE
CERTAIN STANDARD
The Board and court decisions on this issue have suggested
and employed several theoretical lines between the permissible
and impermissible forms of assistance. Some have the advantage
of mimicking the NLRA's language, others of creating a bright-
line rule for when assistance is permissible, and still others of
ending the issue altogether by prohibiting assistance completely.
Each theory, however, presents corresponding disadvantages,
some practical and others constitutional. This Part will examine
the advantages and disadvantages of (1) an effects-based inquiry,
(2) a prophylactic rule, (3) a timing-based rule, and (4) two varia-
tions of a rule prohibiting all "nontrivial assistance whenever
rendered."
Ultimately this Comment concludes that labor policy would
be best served by a rule that would prohibit nontrivial assistance
regardless of its timing or effects but define nontrivial relatively
broadly. In addition, this Comment recommends that the Board
and courts establish a prospective categorization of various forms
of assistance as trivial or nontrivial. Because the NLRB is reluc-
tant to use its express rulemaking authority, 9 the Board and re-
viewing courts should, in their future decisions, separately clas-
sify each form of assistance provided by the employer as trivial or
nontrivial and develop a standard for determining how much
trivial assistance may be provided before it crosses the threshold
and becomes nontrivial.
filed and each rerun election conducted consumes significant resources.
Koenig, 126 F3d at 950.




The effects-based test interprets "ministerial aid" to give em-
ployers the right to "provide the workers with any assistance that
doesn't interfere with their freedom of choice." The Seventh Cir-
cuit in Koenig suggested that this is "the standard implied by sec-
tions 7 and 8 of the Act,'" and one NLRB member, dissenting
from the Board's decision in Koenig, similarly concluded that
"ultimately, the issue is whether the employer interfered with
employee rights guaranteed by the Act."72 Thus, a standard that
focuses on employee freedom of choice would promote the NLRA's
purpose as expressed in Section 7.
Of the proposed interpretations of "ministerial aid," the ef-
fects-based inquiry is probably the most frequently used in the
decisions. Moreover, it most closely relates to the rationale for the
standard, the employees' Section 7 rights. 3 If decertification ex-
ists in order to ensure that employees are exercising their free
choice regarding union representation, the Board ought to focus
on how the employer's actions affect that free choice and not
whether the aid may be defined as '"ministerial" or not. The ef-
fects-based interpretation thus has the initial advantages of
precedent and common sense.
On the other hand, the Board and reviewing courts incur
significant decision costs when they use an effects-based inquiry
because they must consider not only the objective facts, such as
what the employer did, but also the employees' subjective percep-
tion of how the employer's actions influenced their free choice.
The more information necessary to make a decision and the more
subjective that information, the less likely it is that the Board or
any decisionmaker will make the correct decision. These disad-
vantages probably outweigh the initial appeal of an interpreta-
tion that seems facially to force the Board to adhere to Section 7,
but that in fact, because of the case-by-case examination proce-
dures, allows the Board wide latitude for both error and caprice.
Koenig, 126 F3d at 949.
,1 Id. The court noted that the NLRB has explicitly used this standard at times (see,
for example, Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundary, 268 NLRB at 339), on the premise
that Sections 7 and 8, employee freedom of choice and employer noninterference, define
the limits of allowable assistance.
" 321 NLRB at 1263 (Member Cohen dissenting).
See note 3. The point of Sections 7 and 8 is to ensure that employees are free to
choose or not to choose union representation; employer actions, whatever their intent, that
have no effect on the exercise of that choice would therefore be irrelevant.
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B. Prophylactic Rule
At the other extreme, the most obvious solution to the uncer-
tainty problem is a bright-line approach occasionally used by the
Board:74 forbid employers from assisting their employees beyond
directing them to the NLRB, regardless of whether the employer's
actions influence the employees or the employees know of the
employer's actions. If the Board finds any additional assistance
by the employer (whenever rendered), it will disallow the em-
ployer's withdrawal of recognition, invalidate the employees' de-
certification petition, and/or rerun any decertification election.
The prophylactic rule overlaps significantly with the stricter of
the two "nontrivial assistance" standards that are discussed be-
low. They differ, however, in that under the prophylactic rule the
employees' knowledge of the employer's conduct is irrelevant. The
prophylactic rule focuses on the employer's conduct and incen-
tives and chills even those surreptitious forms of assistance about
which the employees may know nothing, on the understanding
that Section 7 requires employers to stay completely out of the
employees' choice of representation.
If one adopts a cynical view of all assistance employers ren-
der to employees involved in a decertification campaign and as-
sumes that employees will, if uncoerced, choose to remain in their
unions, the prophylactic rule would be not only predictable, but
also accurate. This perspective corresponds to the understanding
of the NLRA's drafters, who mandated that a union buffer be
available between employer and employee as a way of protecting
powerless employees from exploitative employers. For example,
Section 1 of the NLRA states its purpose: to rectify "[t]he ine-
quality of bargaining power between employees who do not pos-
sess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized." 5 Similarly, provisions such as
Section 8(a)(2)'s "company union" prohibition8 rely on the
' Apparent examples of the prophylactic approach may be seen in Hearst Corp, 281
NLRB at 764-65 (finding that the existence of labor violations, of which only some employ-
ees were aware, tainted the vote); Koenig, 321 NLRB at 1260 (finding that the employer's
suggested rewording of the petition tainted the vote); Pic Way Shoe Mart, 308 NLRB 84,
84 (1992) (finding that the employer violated the Act by calling the NLRB rather than
giving the employee the number).
29 US0 § 151.
"Section 8(a)(2) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it.L " 29 USC § 158(aX2). This provision has been
deemed to preclude cooperative arrangements, like "employee action committees," which
touch on terms or conditions of employment. See, for example, Electromation, Inc, 309
NLRB 990, 990 (1992), affd, 35 F3d 1148 (7th Cir 1994).
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NLRA's assumption "that workers, if given freedom of choice,
would resoundingly prefer representation by independent unions.
... [Section 8(a)(2)] could be viewed as corresponding to, and
helping to effectuate, the underlying desires of the affected work-
ers. 7
However, this view of labor relations may not be suited to to-
day's workplace; many labor law commentators opine that the
adversarial model of the workplace reflected in the NLRA is out-
moded and that the NLRA's reliance on it in fact restricts prog-
ress in working conditions and productivity.78 Similarly, it seems
anachronistic to continue to presume that any and all assistance
employers give employees who seek to decertify their unions
comes from the employers' ultimate desire to exploit soon-to-be-
powerless employees. Doubtless, antiunion animus motivates
employer assistance in many cases,79 particularly where the em-
ployer initially suggests the process, 0 but much more often em-
Estreicher, 69 NYU L Rev at 133 (cited in note 6).
78 One commentator has argued that the NLRA as a whole is no longer enlarging em-
ployee power to deal with the employer and to improve living conditions and that we need
legislative action to improve its operations. Joan E. Baker, NLRA Section 8(a)(3) and the
Search for a National Labor Policy, 7 Hofstra Labor L J 71, 72 (1989) ("The legislative
proposals [outlined here] . . . suggest that sweeping changes be made to existing labor
legislation by requiring fbndamental ... redefinition of national labor policy."). For exam-
ples that use the same theme to criticize, and suggest reforms of, Section 8(aX2) specifi-
cally, see Estreicher, 69 NYU L Rev at 125 (cited in note 6) (arguing for the repeal of Sec-
tion 8(aX2) except as it outlaws the deceptive installation of employer-dominated organi-
zations to represent employees collectively); Sharon G. Clarke, Rethinking the Adversarial
Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for a Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 Yale L J 2021,
2021 (1987) (arguing that Congress should implement a system whereby groups of work-
ers could choose between cooperative and adversarial models). See also Mark Barenberg,
Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to
Flexible Production, 94 Colum L Rev 753, 946-47 (1994) (suggesting a new policy interpre-
tation of Section 8(aX2) based on standards of nondomination).
" See, for example, NLRB v Sky Wolf Sales, 470 F2d 827, 828-30 (9th Cir 1972);
Hearst Corp, 281 NLRB at 782; Weisser Optical Co, 274 NLRB 961, 961 (1985) ("The rec-
ord reveals that... in early 1983, the Respondent's owner ... asked [an] employee to ini-
tiate a decertification effort, explaining that he wanted to rid the Respondent of the Un-
ion. [Employee] reluctantly agreed, and was provided a booklet explaining the Board's de-
certification process."); Cummins Component Plant, 259 NLRB 456, 456-57 (1981);
Craftool Manufacturing Co, 229 NLRB 634, 636-37 (1977); Allou Distributors, Inc, 201
NLRB 47, 52-53 (1973) (The employer, who stated that "he would rather go out of business
than accept some of the Union's demands," prepared a decertification petition for his em-
ployees.).
' Interestingly, these are often cases that the prophylactic rule reaches but that the
strict interpretation of a ban on all nontrivial assistance (see below) might not-such as
when the illicit suggestion is made to employees who have no role in the eventual decerti-
fication effort. See, for example, Hearst Corp, 281 NLRB at 765; Central Washington Hos-
pital, 279 NLRB at 64-65. As a general rule, the Board's lolicy prohibiting employers from
suggesting decertification to complaining employees might be criticized as counterproduc-
tive when one considers that many employees are not aware of the option. A better solu-
tion than allowing employer suggestion, though, is for the NLRB to require that employers
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ployer assistance results from an employee inquiry or request81 or
is offered after the decertification petition process is well under-
way. 2 In many cases the very context of the assistance exempli-
fies the cooperative relationship between the employer and the
employees that many commentators argue the NLRA detrimen-
tally discourages. The possibility remains, of course, that the em-
ployer's assistance-however innocent-might still influence the
outcome of an election, if one eventually occurs. But the possibil-
ity of influencing an election "would still be some distance from
interfering with free choice; choices are made on a weighing of in-
fluences."' Thus, it is likely that a prophylactic rule impinges on
employer behavior far beyond what is necessary to protect the
employees' Section 7 rights.
The prophylactic rule may also be unconstitutional. Though
the cases tend to focus on employer actions to assist decertifica-
tion efforts, most also involve at least some employer speech. If
antiunion speech to employees in the context of a decertification
effort were considered within the scope of the prophylactic rule
(as it should be, given its potential to aid or influence the decerti-
fication effort), the rule might violate the First Amendment and
the concurrent free speech clause contained in Section 8(c) of the
NLRAY 4 A complete treatment of this important provision of the
NLRA is beyond the scope of this Comment, but a brief explana-
tion of the limits these constitutional and statutory speech pro-
tections would place on the prophylactic rule is in order.
post this information in every workplace, in order to inform employees of the decertifica-
tion process. See text accompanying notes 120-21.
" See, for example, Ernst Home Centers, 308 NLRB 848, 848 (1992); Pic Way Shoe
Mart, 308 NLRB at 84; Eastern States, 275 NLRB at 371; Placke Toyota, 215 NLRB at
395; Dayton Blueprint Co, 193 NLRB at 1107-08.
' One of the most obvious examples of this situation is the ride the employer provided
its employees to the NLRB office in Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry, 268 NLRB
at 339, and in Royal Himmel Distilling Co, 203 NLRB at 374.
Koenig, 126 F3d at 950.
29 USC § 158(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evi-
dence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such ex-
pression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
The Seventh Circuit mentioned the possible conflict with this provision:
And the bearing of the free-speech clause in the [NLRA] would have to be considered,
though it is not argued that the clause entitles employers to engage in as it were con-
tinuous campaigning to persuade their employees to forgo collective bargaining, and
it is the very core of the rule whose scope is in issue in this case that the employer
may not urge his employees to seek decertification.
Koenig, 126 F3d at 950 (citations omitted).
1018 [66:999
1999] Ministerial Aid 1019
Section 8(c) was added to the NLRA in the 1947 Taft-Hartley
Act' to provide greater protection for employer speech than the
Board had provided and to ensure that noncoercive speech would
not be construed as an unfair labor practice. In NLRB v Gissel
Packing Co,' the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment
protects noncoercive employer speech.87 The Supreme Court views
Section 8(c) as a method of implementing the First Amendment
in the labor context," though it has construed the protection rela-
tively narrowly in the representation context. The Board's "labo-
ratory conditions" doctrine, which allows the Board to set aside
elections as "tainted" even though the employer's speech did not
rise to the level of an unfair labor practice,89 has further limited
the First Amendment's impact in the context of representation
elections by requiring election results to be set aside on the basis
of otherwise protected speech."
If a prophylactic rule were interpreted as including speech
within its scope, it would infi-nge on the employer's speech still
futher than current Board doctrine. The First Amendment re-
quires that restrictions on speech be narrowly drawn.9' Even con-
sidering the entire decertification process (petition, waiting, and
"Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub L No 101, 61 Stat 135, 140, codified at
29 USC § 158(c) (1994). Section 8(c) reiterates the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB u
Virginia Electric & Power Co, 314 US 469 (1941) (holding that the NLRA does not forbid
employers from expressing their views on unions).
395 US 575 (1969).
Id at 617. The Gissel standard allows noncoercive speech, including only those pre-
dictions about the economic consequences of unionization that are based on objective facts
and not within the employer's control. See also Thomas v Collins, 323 US 516, 537-38
(1945) (recognizing that employers' attempts to convince employees to join, or not join,
unions are "within the First Amendment's guaranty").
"The Board has held that Section 8(c) is not applicable in representation cases but
that the First Amendment is. Dal-Tex Optical Co, 137 NLRB 1782 (1962).
"The "laboratory conditions" ideal was enunciated in General Shoe Corp, 77 NLRB
124, 127 (1948).
"Both the laboratory conditions doctrine and the stringency of the Gissel standard
relative to ordinary First Amendment analysis have been widely criticized. See, for exam-
ple, Cynthia Milne, New Freedom for Employer Communications, 3 Hofstra Labor L J 235,
243-49 (1986) (criticizing the Board for past decisions that made employer suggestions of
decertification a per se violation and applauding the Board's retreat from that position);
Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43
Md L Rev 4, 19-20 (1984) (strongly critiquing the restriction of speech rights in the labor
context generally as resting on a "common, stereotyped, and paternalistic vision of work-
ers as people whose decisions are not made on the basis of ideas and persuasion but on the
basis of fear, coercion and discipline"). For the opposite perspective, see Alan Story, Em-
ployer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 Berkeley J
Emp & Labor L 356, 381-405 (1995) (arguing that employer speech is corporate commer-
cial speech and should be given less constitutional protection).
" Sylvia G. Eaves, Employer Free Speech During Representation Elections, 35 SC L
Rev 617, 642-43 (1984).
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election) to be an election-like situation covered by the laboratory
conditions doctrine, the availability of less restrictive means of
ensuring noncoercive elections (such as focusing on the effects of
speech) suggests that the prophylactic rule's complete prohibition
of an employer's pro-decertification or antiunion speech would fail
the First Amendment test. The Board's rule that the employer
may not suggest decertification to its employees could survive92 if
one assumes that, but for the employer's suggestion, the employ-
ees would not have decertified the union. A prophylactic rule pro-
hibiting all employer speech once the employees have expressed
their intentions in some form, however, would be constitutionally
questionable.
The other, less fundamental but still significant danger of a
prophylactic rule is that employees might seek assistance and
unwittingly cause an employer to violate the rule, thereby de-
feating the exercise of their own free choice. In Dayton Blueprint
Co, for example, it was unclear f the employer knew in advance
why the employees were borrowing the company car, yet the
Board imputed the assistance to the employer and invalidated
the petition.93 This may be a common problem, as employees very
often think nothing of using the office copier for matters at least
somewhat related to work (as a decertification petition would be),
circulating a decertification petition on working time, or even
thaving a company secretary type up a short handwritten state-
ment. Each of these actions, however, would violate a prophylac-
tic rule; the rule would thereby impair the employees' exercise of
free choice."4
As Milne notes, though, this position contrasts with the Board's "longstanding rule
that an employer can permissibly bring to the employees' attention their [analogous] right
to resign from a union and to revoke their dues checkoff authorizations 'so long as the
communication is free from any threat or coercion." Milne, 3 Hofstra Labor L J at 246
(cited in note 90), citing Landmark International Trucks, Inc v NLRB, 699 F2d 815, 820
(6th Cir 1983). Prohibiting employers from suggesting decertification also runs counter to
the employees' free exercise of their Section 7 rights, given their probable ignorance of the
option. See note 12.
193 NLRB at 1107-08.
See text accompanying notes 41-44 for discussion of cases involving these and other
unintentional forms of assistance. In Quinn Company, 273 NLRB 795 (1984), for example,
the employees had used company paper and typing services and circulated the petition on
company time. The Board held the employer did not violate an effects-based rule because
the employees acted without its knowledge. Id at 796. This same situation, however, could
be held to violate a prophylactic rule if the employer did not object once it learned of the




NLRB Member Cohen, dissenting from the Board's Koenig
decision,"5 advocated a timing-based rule: "In applying the
Board's test, it is significant to ascertain whether the employer
involvement comes while decertification efforts are germinating
or whether the employer involvement comes after the occurrence
of a free and fair expression of employee desires regarding the
union.' Given that employee free choice is the purported aim of
Section 7, he argued that an employer's assistance after employ-
ees have made their choice cannot interfere with the employees'
exercise of that choice; if provided after the employee's decision,
the employer's aid is therefore almost always "ministerial assis-
tance to assure that the choice, having been freely made, is effec-
tuated."' Noting that the Board had concluded that Koenig un-
lawfully aided the employees by providing the proper language
for the petition, an attorney to count the petitions, and clerical
support, Cohen remarked, "[t]he problem with this listing of
events is that they all took place after the employees freely voted
to reject the Union as their representative."98
In its simplest form, a timing-based rule would prohibit all
assistance (aside from referring the employees to the Board) be-
fore the employer has evidence of an employee choice; after the
choice has been made, it would allow any noncoercive assistance.
The rule would provide a bright line-the employees' vote via pe-
tition to decertify-for the Board, courts, and employers to use in
assessing whether assistance is allowable without being as re-
strictive as the prophylactic rule. Employers could communicate
this black-and-white rule to employees to avoid the relationship-
damaging appearance of being unwilling to help. Of course, an
employer might be uncertain as to whether or when the employ-
ees have freely chosen,' but this ambiguity seems less likely than
uncertainty about the future effects of contemplated employer as-
sistance because the former can be determined with less subjec-
tive inquiry. The rule's biggest advantage may be that it avoids
the inquiry into whether assistance is "ministerial" or "trivial" al-




The most obvious examples arise in cases like Koenig, where employees inexpertly
drafted a petition that conveyed a desire to get rid of the union but where the NLRB felt
the petition did not express a clear desire to decertify. A timing-based rule would pre-
sumably consider the employees' petition as evidence of their decision, as the Seventh Cir-
cuit did; confusion, however, could still arise.
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together, thereby avoiding the ambiguity inherent in this classifi-
cation.
The biggest disadvantage of the rule falls on employees who
seek to decertify, and thus it probably outweighs all the advan-
tages. The timing-based rule forbids any assistance before the
employees as a whole have spoken."° It precludes most of the
common forms of assistance (usually allowed by the Board"01 ) that
employers give to employees who instigate the decertification pe-
tition: drafting or advising on language (except in rare cases like
Koenig's, where the employees had voted first on an improperly
worded statement),02 providing clerical assistance, and allowing
circulation of the petition on company time. Each of these forms
of assistance may well be essential to the success of a particular
petition; by not allowing them, the rule may prevent employees
from exercising their choice to decertify their union. Under this
rule, although the employer may mail petitions and provide a
ride to the Board office (because the employees will have already
made the decision to decertify), employee free choice will none-
theless be impeded unless the instigating employees are unusu-
ally tenacious when they first seek decertification. By making the
initiation of a decertification petition and thus the exercise of
Section 7 rights more difficult, the simplicity of the timing-based
interpretation of "ministerial aid" proves a poor policy choice.
Though it allows employers to provide assistance after the em-
ployees as a whole have decided to decertify the union, it prohib-
its assistance when the decertification effort may need it most.
D. Prohibition on All "Nontrivial Assistance
Whenever Rendered" 3
In Koenig, the Seventh Circuit suggested that "it would not
be irrational for the Board to take the strictest view and bar all
nontrivial assistance whenever rendered; the argument would be
that assistance in filing the petition for decertification could con-
ceivably influence the workers' vote in the subsequent decertifica-
tion election if one were ordered."' °4 This proposal is susceptible
'"'Like the application of a prophylactic rule, this rule may run afoul of the employer
free speech provision and the First Amendment. See text accompanying notes 84-92.
0' See, for example, Ernst Home Centers, 308 NLRB at 848; Eastern States, 275 NLRB
at 371-72; Quinn Company, 273 NLRB at 796; Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry,
268 NLRB at 339; Times-Herald, Inc, 253 NLRB at 524; GAF Corporation, 195 NLRB at
169.
1, See also Rock-Tenn Co v NLRB, 69 F3d 803, 806 (7th Cir 1995).




to two interpretations, one that views "nontrivial" as anything
that the employees know about beyond referring employees to the
NLRB ("strict") and one that classifies many ordinary forms of
assistance as trivial because they are unlikely to influence em-
ployee votes ("commonsense").
The Board seems to have used this idea, with both interpre-
tations of trivial, to interpret the "ministerial aid" standard in
several cases." 5 In Placke Toyota,' for example, the Board took a
strict view, stating that "[alithough an employer does not violate
the Act by referring an employee to the Board in response to a re-
quest for advice relative to removing a union as the bargaining
representative, it is unlawful for him subsequently to involve
himself in furthering employee efforts directed toward that very
end.""° Later, in Koenig, the Board interpreted this passage more
leniently, indicating that previous decisions allow an employer to
provide not only necessary information for the preparation of the
decertification petition' but also the wording when requested by
the employees,0 9 though it did not allow the employer to provide
an attorney to count and verify the decertification petitions after
his employees had acted."0
The critical distinction between either formulation of the
"nontrivial" proposal and the effects-based inquiry"' is that the
bar on nontrivial assistance (however defined) applies not only
before but after the employees have affirmatively selected decerti-
fication. In other words, the bar applies even when there is no
danger of an employer interfering with employees' Section 7
rights to sign the petition and when in fact the assistance might
help the employees to exercise their rights fully. In this way, it
could be argued, the bar, especially under the strict interpreta-
tion, may be too restrictive, since many months intervene be-
'"The Koenig decision cites, for example, Cummins Component Plant, 259 NLRB at
460-61; Times-Herald, Inc, 253 NLRB at 524; Dayton Blueprint Co, 193 NLRB at 1107-08.
215 NLRB 395 (1974).
" Id at 395 (citations omitted).
'Koenig, 321 NLRB at 1259, citing Ernst Home Centers, 308 NLRB at 848.
"UKoenig, 321 NLRB at 1259, citing Eastern States, 275 NLRB at 371. A truly strict
interpretation of "nontrivial" would probably prohibit even the provision of wording the
Board allowed in Eastern States. Instead, it would probably only allow the employer to re-
fer his employees to the NLRB, without providing a phone number or any additional in-
formation to employees, save that which they could not get on their own.
"'Koenig, 321 NLRB at 1259.
.1. Note that the categorization of acts as trivial or nontrivial will probably include an
effects-based inquiry on a general level--the likely perception of an employee who knew
his employer had allowed thousands of copies to be made at company expense will almost
necessarily influence the Board's (or the courts') classification of such assistance as trivial
or not.
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tween the filing of a petition and the issuance of a post-election
decision."'
1. Strict interpretation.
A truly strict interpretation of "nontrivial" or "nonministe-
rial""3 would bar any and all assistance beyond (1) referring the
employees to the NLRB and (2) providing the information about
the company necessary to complete the form. This is essentially
the prophylactic rule, except that it requires that the employees
know about the assistance."
The justifications the Koenig court provided for this rule
seem to suggest that the court had a stringent interpretation of
"nontrivial" in mind: any assistance, by connoting approval,
might influence the workers' votes. This formulation, however,
shares the drawbacks of the prophylactic rule: (1) it could damage
a generally cooperative employer-employee relationship; (2) it
could impede the exercise of the employees' free choice; and (3) it
may infringe the employer's right to free speech."'
2. A commonsense interpretation.
The second, more novel interpretation views "trivial" in a
more commonsense way, relying on a sort of everyday under-
standing that would allow the Board and courts to categorize cer-
tain forms of assistance as trivial and thus per se permissible,
and other forms as nontrivial and thus per se impermissible. As
is usually the case with the NLRA, the Board would be responsi-
ble for the bulk of this categorization task. The courts' involve-
ment here would be limited to explaining how their classification
differs from the NLRB's in cases where they disagree with the
Board. In addition to classifying the individual forms of assis-
tance, Board and court decisions would reach ultimate conclu-
sions that would provide guidance in determining how many
trivial acts constitute nontrivial assistance. This sort of categori-
zation seems ideal for employers. When confronted by an em-
ployee request for aid, the employers could simply run down a list
of permitted forms of aid, add up the number of times they had
'In representation cases, the Board has a median time of 267 days between the filing
of a petition and the issuance of a post-election decision. See Sixty-First Annual Report at
Table 23 (cited in note 10).
"' Throughout this Part, the terms "trivial/nontrivial" and "ministerial/nonministerial"
are used interchangeably.
"'The implications of this variation of the nontrivial rule are similar to those of the
prophylactic rule, discussed in Part HILB.
1- 29 USC § 158(c). See also text accompanying notes 84-92.
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rendered trivial assistance to this decertification effort, and de-
termine whether they could or could not legally accommodate the
employees' request. (This analysis assumes that the employer has
not engaged in any unfair labor practices."6 ) The Board (and re-
viewing courts) could create this list by expressly stating in deci-
sions which forms of assistance, considered alone, would have
been found harmlessly "ministerial" and which, either alone or in
combination, would cause a violation. This process of decision-
making would give effect to the prescription in Section 8(aXl)
that an employer not interfere with his employees' free choice,
while avoiding the strict constraints on employer assistance that
could limit employees in the exercise of their Section 7 right to
choose not to engage in union activities.
Unfortunately, no single list can anticipate every employee
request. Nor can it make the distinctions based on degree that
the Board or reviewing court will make. There is, for example, a
significant difference between allowing an employee to make
three copies of a petition on an office copier and allowing her to
make three thousand, or between providing a ride across town to
the nearest NLRB office and providing a ride across the state.
The uncertainty will dissipate over time, though. Order of magni-
tude questions will result in uncertainty and union challenges;
for that very reason they will be frequently litigated in the early
stages of categorization. As the categorization in the decisions
progresses as more cases are decided, uncertainty about magni-
tude will decrease. For example, once the NLRB has deemed two
hundred copies trivial and five hundred copies nontrivial, the
area of uncertainty will be significantly narrowed.
Moreover, as the categorization progresses, more forms of as-
sistance will be addressed in decisions and the decisions will pro-
vide greater guidance as to how many trivial acts constitute non-
trivial assistance. The categorization cannot completely eliminate
Board or judicial judgments; there will always be forms of assis-
tance that remain unaddressed and the allowance or disallow-
ance of certain types of assistance must be only presumptive.
Even so, the enumeration would come to eliminate a significant
amount of the uncertainty in this area, thereby reducing decision
costs. Unlike the current standard, under which the Board con-
siders each instance of alleged employer interference anew, this
solution would obligate the Board to adhere to its earlier deci-
"'The Board's usual disallowance of any assistance in the context of related unfair la-
bor practices should remain intact, since unfair labor practices by definition interfere with
employee free choice.
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sions, thus establishing a rule over time through adjudication
rather than rulemaking. Given the NLRB's unwillingness to is-
sue a comprehensive formal rule (which might actually be less
valuable because it would be fixed in time and thereby less re-
sponsive to disputes that arise), the gradually increasing prospec-
tive certainty that categorization affords employers seems the
best alternative.
This more intuitive understanding of "nontrivial" is subject
to many of the criticisms raised under the strict interpretation
(that is, it may bar employer assistance that will not have an im-
pact on the employees' ability to exercise their free choice). But
the commonsense interpretation blunts this criticism by acknowl-
edging the suggestion (present both in the criticism of the
NLRA's vision of employer-employee relations"7 and in the Koe-
nig court's decision".) that employees think more independently
than the drafters of the NLRA presumed and can exercise their
free choice even in the presence of significant influence by their
employers. The commonsense approach would allow at any time
minor forms of assistance that a timing rule would allow only af-
ter the decertification petition is underway. On the other hand,
after evidence of an employee decision, the commonsense ap-
proach would continue to bar the few major forms of assistance
that the timing-based rule would allow, but that would probably
interfere with the employees' free choice in the later election.
Employees, it can be assumed, will presuppose that employ-
ers favor decertification. It takes little away from that presump-
tion if the Board forbids the employer to assist in any way. By the
same token, little is added to that presumption if the employer
provides such 'trivial" support as helping the employee word a
petition, allowing employees access to the photocopying machine,
providing an attorney to count the already rendered decertifica-
tion petitions, or allowing employees to circulate the petition on
company time. In the end, allowing 'trivial," noncoercive assis-
... See note 90 for articles criticizing the NLRA's vision of employees. Professor Getman
notes that the cases
manifest, a common, stereotyped, and paternalistic vision of workers as people whose
decisions are not made on the basis of ideas and persuasion but on the basis of fear,
coercion, and discipline ... as though the Court imagines labor relations to be a
realm in which the free expression of ideas is unimportant because they are not the
basis upon which actions are taken, votes cast, or picket lines observed.
Getman, 43 Md L Rev at 19-20 (cited in note 90).
"'The argument that assistance in filing the petition "could conceivably influence the
workers' vote in the subsequent decertification election . . . would still be some distance
from interfering with free choice; choices are made on a weighing of influences." Koenig,
126 F3d at 950.
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tance to employees serves as a proxy for the effects-based inquiry
and comes back to the "unquestioned standard that the employer
must not, by his assistance to the employees who are seeking to
disconnect from the union, interfere with employee free choice."" 9
The categorization of nontrivial assistance simply allows certain
forms of employer assistance to be presumptively valid and thus
pass unchallenged by the union, lowering transaction costs for
employees who opt to decertify their unions. Because the list is
only presumptive and never truly "complete," the Board retains
the ability to confront apparent gaming when it threatens to in-
terfere with employee choice. By dramatically reducing employ-
ers' prospective uncertainty without fully relinquishing control,
the Board will lower uncertainty costs without significantly in-
creasing error costs.
3. Creating employee awareness of decertification.
Even defining "nontrivial" broadly, the Board should still
prohibit employers from suggesting (unprompted) a decertifica-
tion petition to an employee. The suggestion to an employee igno-
rant of decertification cannot be construed as "assisting" the em-
ployee in decertification because the employee is not at the time
taking steps toward decertification. In fact, such a suggestion
made to an employee who might be easily intimidated could be
perceived as coercive, even if the employer has not otherwise re-
vealed hostility towards the union. Thus, there must be some
other mechanism to ensure that employees are aware of the exis-
tence of the decertification process. One commentator has sug-
gested that the NLRB comprehensively inform employees of this
right;" this proposal seems to put responsibility on the least-
conflicted and best-situated party. For example, a poster pro-
duced by the NLRB and required to be prominently displayed in
every workplace-like the Fair Labor Standards Act and Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act posters, which are so familiar in
workplaces-would quickly solve the initial information problem
without presenting the danger of unspoken employer coercion.'2 '
"sId.
'"Ray, 1984 Ariz St L J at 267 (cited in note 12).
"' See Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for Informing Employees
of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32 Harv J Leg 431 (1995) (sug-
gesting a formal rule by the NLRB requiring such a poster).
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CONCLUSION
The NLRB currently uses a "ministerial aid" test to deter-
mine which forms of assistance it will permit employers to render
to employee decertification efforts. Unfortunately, this test--as
formulated and as applied-is too muddled to provide useful
guidance to employers. A more intuitive, lenient understanding of
"ministerial" would show a greater respect for the self-
determination of employees and would likely produce both a more
cooperative workplace and union-related decisions that more ac-
curately reflect employees' free choice. The enumeration of forms
of assistance as permissible or impermissible in future Board
(and court) decisions, coupled with the provision by the NLRB of
information on the decertification process to all employees (ide-
ally through a standard poster in each workplace), would produce
lower decision costs than the effects-based standard, provide cer-
tainty to both employer and employees, and avoid the First
Amendment difficulties raised by stricter rules.
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